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 Meta-Analysis: A Critical Realist Critique and Alternative 
  
Abstract 
Meta-analysis has proved increasingly popular in management and 
organisation studies as a way of combining existing empirical quantitative 
research to generate a statistical estimate of how strongly variables are 
associated. Whilst a number of studies identify technical, procedural and 
practical limitations of meta-analyses, none have yet tackled the meta-
theoretical flaws in this approach. We deploy critical realist meta-theory 
to argue that the individual quantitative studies, upon which meta-analysis 
relies, lack explanatory power because they are rooted in quasi-empiricist 
meta-theory. This problem, we argue, is carried over in meta-analyses.  We 
then propose a ‘Critical Realist Synthesis’ as a potential alternative to the 
use of meta-analysis in organisation studies and social science more 
widely.  
 
 
Keywords 
Meta-analysis, meta-theory, critical realism, ontology, epistemology, aetiology, open and 
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1. Introduction 
 
According Bornmann & Mutz (2015) the quantity of published research doubles every nine 
years. This increases the appeal of methods that facilitate the integration and synthesis of 
existing research. Recently, social scientists, especially those working in management and 
organisation studies (MOS), have developed three basic methods to synthesise existing 
research: systematic review, meta-interpretation and meta-analysis (MA). This paper adds to a 
significant body of literature dedicated to critically evaluating MA. To date, critical evaluation 
has, primarily, engaged with the technical, procedural and practical problems of MA, and has, 
implicitly, presumed that resolving these problems is both necessary and sufficient to make MA 
more effective. Whilst these debates are welcome, they do not address the meta-theoretical 
underpinnings of MA, which is the focus of this paper. Our argument is that MA is of limited 
use in explaining the kind of social or organizational phenomena of interest to readers of 
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Human Relations – and cognate journals. This is not due to technical, procedural and practical 
problems in the application of MA, but due to the flawed meta-theory underpinning MA. 
Instead, we propose an alternative that we refer to as `critical realist synthesis´ (CRS), rooted 
in an entirely different meta-theory – a term we use to include methodology, ontology, 
epistemology, aetiology, and concepts of explanation, prediction and theory. 
 
To make this argument, we start with an overview of MA, and provide a brief synopsis of some 
extant criticisms or what we term its ‘known problems’. We then provide a critical realist1 
critique of the meta-theoretical underpinnings of MA by drawing on two highly cited recent 
pieces of MA to illustrate our argument. By way of contrast, we then outline CRS and argue, 
whilst it ostensibly provides less ‘certainty’ than MA, CRS generates greater explanatory 
power, and is based on more realistic ontological premises. 
 
2.0 What is MA? 
 
MA first appeared in the field of medicine in 1904 as a method of aggregating data from 
experimental research. After World War Two it expanded into the fields of psychology, 
education and social science research. The primary aim of contemporary MA is to compute a 
weighted mean of effect size between phenomena; the secondary aim is to identify moderating 
(and mediating) variables. Let us take a closer look: 
 
Meta-analysis, literally the statistical analysis of statistical analyses, describes a set 
of procedures for systematically reviewing the research examining a particular 
effect, and combining the results of independent studies to estimate the size of the 
effect in the population ... The outcome of a meta-analysis is a weighted mean effect 
size which reflects the population effect size more accurately than any of the 
individual estimates (Ellis 2010: 94-5). 
 
[M]eta-analysis is ... a method that estimates an overall `effect-size´ of a range of 
studies from the individual effect sizes of each individual study, thus giving greater 
                                                 
1 We recognise that CR is a broad church, encompassing original critical realism, dialectical critical realism, the 
‘spiritual turn’, and other variants. The theorising we propose here is based on the original tenents of critical 
realism (Bhaskar 1975), but is equally compatible with (though perhaps less interesting to) any of the 
subsequent versions. 
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‘power’ to the overall statistic. It does this by calculating a mean of means of 
means: in the original study, a mean is taken of the effects of a particular variable 
for all points in a study, then variables are averaged to provide an overall effect size 
(mean) for that study, and then the effect sizes of a number of studies are averaged 
in the MA procedure (Weed 80-81). 
 
An effect can be the result of a treatment revealed in a comparison between groups 
(e.g., [medically] treated and untreated groups) or it can describe the degree of 
association between two related variables (e.g., treatment dosage and health). An 
effect size refers to the magnitude of the result as it occurs, or would be found, in 
the population. (Ellis 2010: 4, 6-7) 
 
`Effect size´ is a measure of the association or relationship between two variables across a range 
of carefully selected studies. Such analysis presumes that values of independent variables will 
be related to, or associated with, values of dependent variables if they are observed to regularly 
occur together with sufficient frequency, with statistical techniques being deployed to identify 
this association and its properties. On the presumption that the association is causal, 
independent variables are thought to have a (causal) effect on dependent variables. The term 
`effect size´, then, refers to the magnitude of the association between independent and 
dependent variables. This then forms the basis for testing meta-hypotheses. 
 
If the MA fails to explain an (arbitrary) 75% of the variance, or we know in advance that there 
are significant differences in effect sizes across studies, then a moderator analysis can be 
conducted: 
 
Moderation represents the idea that the magnitude of the effect of an antecedent 
(e.g., organizational structure or strategy) on firm outcomes depends on 
contingency factors, such as the uncertainty and instability of the environment ... 
[M]oderation refers to the conditions under which an effect varies in size, whereas 
mediation refers to underlying mechanisms and processes that connect antecedents 
and outcomes (Aguinis et al., 2013: 1-2) 
 
MA assumes that the effective aggregation of information creates greater statistical power than 
that derived from any single study, and that results from individual studies are generalisable to 
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a larger population: to ‘translate statistical relations into successful recipes for individual 
organizations’ (Hodgkinson and Rousseau 2009). The ability to determine causes and effects 
is ostensibly enhanced as the population grows (as more studies are added to the MA) and 
inconsistencies between results are quantified and assessed. Moderators and mediators can also 
be included in an attempt to `explain´ variation between results and the presence of forms of 
bias.  
 
These benefits have been asserted in some sections of the MOS field, wherein the value of MA 
has even expanded beyond the realm of synthesis, and towards claiming the generation of new 
knowledge: 
 
Beyond overcoming difficulties associated with individual studies such as sampling 
error, measurement error and restriction of range, MA enable an analyst to synthesise 
the findings of primary studies to test hypotheses that were not testable in those studies 
(Eden, 2002: 841) 
 
Having outlined the basic premise of MA, we now briefly outline the known technical, 
technical, procedural and practical issues with the practice of MA, before moving on to our 
realist critique. 
 
2.1 Known problems 
 
The many technical, procedural and practical (i.e. collection of source data) challenges 
involved in conducting MA have been detailed by a number of authors. First, there is a lack of 
agreement on the basic methods to assess effect size, which in turn produce significantly 
differing results. Whilst calculating effect size requires the subtraction of the mean of the 
control group from the mean of experimental group and dividing the difference by the standard 
deviation, there is no agreement on how this standard deviation is calculated (see Glass, 2000; 
Hough and Hall 1994). 
 
The practical task of constructing a sample also provides a number of issues for MA. The MA 
literature seldom discusses inclusion criteria for data (Rousseau et al., 2008: 491), despite the 
fact that these cannot be generalised across MA. Inclusion criteria are thus ultimately 
judgement calls that vary by the research topic and researcher preferences, yet they impact 
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clearly upon the calculation of effect sizes as they define the source material that constitute the 
analysis. This leads to a problem with publication bias, as published results tend to be those 
that show strong statistical outcomes (Rousseau, et al., 2008). Thus, MA tends to over-represent 
positive results whilst dramatically underreporting those that are null. This has led some to 
argue that results reported as statistically significant may have inbuilt exaggeration bias (Rossi, 
1987). 
 
Relatedly, the validity of effect sizes is a function of the homogeneity of included studies 
(Miller, 1987). This poses a paradox as studies with large sample sizes are privileged, which 
mitigates against the possibility of pooling sufficient homogeneity in terms of research foci, 
especially in social science research. Whilst on the face of it, greater inclusion seem to follow 
the internal logic of MA by increasing the scope and sample size of the analysis, Coyne et al., 
(2011:224) show that including very small scale research in MA is likely to lead to 
‘overestimate effects’ which statistical techniques cannot correct. 
 
The extent to which source studies can be combined is also dependent upon the degree of 
similarity (in terms of definitions, interpretations of key variables, and the deployment of data 
capture techniques) between studies (Linden and Priestley, 2009). However, the codification 
of the process though which this is achieved, is often significantly truncated or even omitted in 
publication. Similarly, the nuanced way in which theories and concepts inform the design and 
operationalisation of the original studies is crucial. Data from original studies require 
manipulation and tabulation to perform MA and, given that these were generated for alternative 
purposes, it is problematic to match the theoretical perspective of the meta-analyst and the 
original research, if the original data is even accessible at all (Cowton, 1998). The consequence 
of this is that effect size analysis may therefore amalgamate statistical findings based on 
differing interpretations of the theoretical hypothesis as well as differentially operationalised 
constructs of study. 
 
A further challenge for MA relates to the quality of source data: any given range of source data 
is likely to display variability in terms of the extent to which they possess internal (elimination 
of bias) and external validity (Franke, 2001). The MA analyst takes for granted that what the 
original analyst did to code the data into concepts is reliable, so one’s measures could be very 
different across studies. This means that the extent to which the results can be generalised to 
their target population is at best questionable. Moreover: 
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method variance is pervasive, ubiquitous, almost invariably in social and behavioural 
science, each array of measurements … contains variance associated with the method. 
Any obtained relationship between two such units can be due to method variance (Fiske 
1982: 82). 
 
Generalisation on the basis of studies with reliability issues will therefore accentuate rather 
than reduce, or correct for, error, and may reflect manipulations of non-comparable 
independent variables and their effects on non-comparable dependent measures. 
 
3.0 A critical realist critique of MA 
 
Whilst the technical, procedural and practical issues with meta-analyses are notable, our 
critique is not based upon these. Indeed even if these problems were resolved, our critique, 
which is meta-theoretical, would remain. To the best of our knowledge, no meta-theoretical 
critique of MA has been undertaken (although, see Pawson 2004). Let us start with establishing 
some basic terms and ideas that will inform the rest of the paper. 
 
First, we use the term ‘causal mechanism’ generically, to refer to things like `social structures´, 
`cultural structures´, ` institutions´, ` conventions, ` norms´, ` rules´, and so on. An HRM practice, 
or a discourse could, for example be causal mechanisms. The term ‘mechanism’ carries no 
connotations of simple additive effects or determinism. It simply refers to a thing that has causal 
powers or, in layperson's language, the ability to affect things. A causal mechanism is causal 
in virtue of the powers it possesses as derived from its properties. The causal powers of any 
mechanism only become enabled when enacted by human agents. When, therefore, we refer to 
a mechanism causing this or that, we always have in mind an agentially enacted mechanism. 
 
Second, we use the term `quantitative empirical studies´ to refer to those studies employing 
quantitative data and statistical research techniques, typically regression analysis. They should 
not be confused with qualitative empirical studies such as ethnographies, case studies, in-depth 
interviews, participant observation and such like2. 
                                                 
2Some research appears to be qualitative because, for example, it is uses interview techniques. But, if the 
analysis ends up quantifying the data from interviews, then it is more accurate to define this as quantitative 
research. 
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Third, for CRs, the objective of social science is not to predict but to explain. This is achieved 
by identifying, and theorising: an appropriate, (qua relevant) agent (A); an appropriate causal 
mechanism3 (M); how agent (A) interprets, and enacts mechanism (M), generating tendencies 
(T) towards outcome (O); other mechanisms, often referred to as `the context´, (Mc) that 
dispose agent A to interact with M and not (say) N. Any putative explanation can then be 
empirically substantiated - i.e. successfully tested, which does not involve simply testing 
quantitative hypotheses. We refer to this as generating theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations.  
 
Fourth, quantitative empirical studies, that provide the source material for MA, are rooted in a 
meta-theory we call ‘quasi-empiricism’4 and comes with a ` chain of meta-theoretical concepts´ 
(Fleetwood 2014), especially ontology, epistemology, methodology, aetiology, and concepts 
relating to open and closed systems, theory, prediction and explanation5. Let us look a little 
closer at this chain of meta-theoretical concepts. 
 
Ontology 
Observed (empirical) events or states of affairs, are the ultimate phenomena about which quasi-
empiricists collect data - e.g. size of organisations; presence of teamwork; being female; 
employee performance. If these events are observed (or proxied) in terms of quantity or degree, 
they become variables – i.e. quantified events. The ontology consists, therefore, of observed 
events or states or affairs that are unique, unconnected or atomistic. 
 
 
Epistemology 
Whilst quantitative empirical researchers are probably aware that the variables they measure 
represent causal mechanisms, broadly conceived, their focus is always on the events these 
                                                 
3We use the singular here (agent and mechanism) for ease of exposition. Most of the time, we 
will have to use the plural (agents and mechanisms). 
4Some use the term, `positivism´. We think `scientism´ is a more accurate description, but stick with the term 
`quasi-empiricism´ to avoid getting embroiled in philosophical definitions that are tangential. For elaboration of 
positivism/empiricism in MOS see Donaldson (1996, 2003, 2005); Johnson & Duberley (2000); and Fleetwood 
& Hesketh (2010). 
5For a CR interpretation of quasi-empiricism´s meta-theoretical underpinnings see Danermark (2002); Sayer 
(2010); Fleetwood (2014) and Fleetwood & Hesketh (2010). 
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mechanisms generate6. If, as presumed, particular knowledge is gained through observing events, 
more general or ‘scientific’ knowledge is gained only if these events manifest themselves as 
regularities in the flux of events or states of affairs7. This is usually styled ‘whenever event 
x1….xn then event y’ or y = f(x1….xn). 
 
Together, this ontological and this epistemological position imply a `flat´ ontology – the 
assumption that all that exists are events (or actions) and people’s perceptions of these events 
(Table 1). 
 
 
Domain Entity 
Empirical Experiences & perceptions 
Actual Events & actions 
 
Table 1. A `flat’ ontology 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The method of quasi-empiricism seeks to generate predictions, typically in the form of 
hypotheses to be refuted or supported via the collection of quantitative data. The only 
phenomena that feature in quantitative empirical research are those capable of being transposed 
into variables - i.e. the quantified expression of events. What cannot be quantified adequately 
is omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 Aetiology 
 
                                                 
6For example, Roth et al, (2010: 275) refer to the `weakening of stereotypes or other related mechanisms´; 
Shirom et al, (2008: 1376) refer to `coping mechanisms´; and Subramony (2010: 747, 759) refers to `feedback 
mechanisms´ and `goal setting and reinforcing mechanisms´. 
7For ease of exposition, we drop the term, `states of affairs´ and refer, simply, to `events´. 
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The notion of causation pre-supposed by quasi-empiricism is referred to as the regularity view of 
causation. As its ontology is of observed atomistic events, its concept of causality cannot be 
conceived of in terms of anything other than events and their regularity. As the epistemology 
of quasi-empiricism is reliant upon identifying event regularities, its conceptualisation of 
causation requires knowledge of event regularities. To know the cause of increased organisational 
performance is, for example, to know that it is regularly preceded by the introduction a bundle of 
HRM practices. More generally, to know the cause of event y, requires us to know (no more than) 
that event x, or events x1, x2...xn, is/are regularly conjoined to event y. 
 
It is worth adding that conclusions are often, usually implicitly, given a universal and general 
`twist´, along with a spurious precision. For example, in their analysis of performance related 
pay (PRP) (Gielen et al. 2010: 291) write that: ‘PRP increases productivity at the firm level by 
9%’. It is not clear if this is understood as a `one off´, or whether this is supposedly 
generalizable to all firms. If the latter, the `9%´ looks to be an example of spurious precision.   
 
Open and closed systems 
 
The quasi-empiricist commitment to causality as regularities in the flux of events requires that 
social or organisational systems are theorised or modelled as if they are closed systems, defined 
thus: Parts of the socio-economic world characterised by regularities in the flux of events (or 
states of affairs) of the form `whenever event x then event y´, or y = f(x) are closed systems, and 
parts of this world not so characterised are open systems (See Bhaskar 1978, Lawson 1995 and 
Fleetwood 2016). Crucially, statistical techniques like regression analysis not only presuppose, 
but only work in, closed systems. Methodologically speaking, quantitative empirical 
researchers of organisation studies must `engineer´ closed systems (only in theory, because a 
real open system such as an organisation cannot be closed) so they can write things like: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Empowerment-enhancing bundles [of HRM practices] will be 
positively correlated with business outcomes (Subramony 2009: 748). 
 
This translates to ` whenever empowerment-enhancing bundles (EEB), then business outcome´, 
or `outcome = f(EEB)´ and, by definition, this describes a closed system. Variations in 
regularity are generally specified probabilistically or stochastically, as random processes 
occurring in the ontic domain. Probability is a measure of the likelihood of an event occurring. 
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The re-conceptualisation of stochastic event regularities using the concepts of probability, 
might be styled ‘whenever event x, then on average event y’, or y = f(x + ε) or more accurately, 
`whenever the realised value of the (independent) variable measuring event or state of affairs 
x, then the conditional mean8 of the (dependent) variable measuring event or state of affairs y’. 
The error term (ε) presents random influences on the dependent variable y and consequently 
converts the mathematical model linking y to the x into a stochastic or statistical model 
representing the population of interest (Downward 2015: 210). If an empirical researcher 
managed to identify a stochastic event regularity (perhaps over a restricted space/time) then 
s/he will have identified a stochastically closed system. Henceforth, we use the phrase `event 
regularities, probabilistically specified’, to refer to the kind of associations identified by 
statistical techniques such as regression analysis and MA. (Fleetwood 2016). 
 
Theory 
 
A theory is often said to have a predictive dimension containing statements delivering 
predictions such as ‘y will follow x’; and an explanatory dimension containing statements 
delivering `explanation´ which, amounts to the same thing. ‘Theory’, then, becomes reduced 
to a set of statements designed to enable predictions, usually, in the form of hypotheses. We 
describe this as `theory´- i.e. with scare quotes - because, in our example, a ‘theory’ that 
explains an increase in organisation performance, is reduced to a statement to the effect that `a 
bundle of HRM practices were introduced´. Whilst other information, perhaps identifying the 
relevant causal agentially enacted mechanisms, is sometimes included, it is, strictly speaking, 
not necessary. This is sometimes referred to as `ultra-empiricism´ or `measurement without 
theory´. 
 
 
 
Prediction and (lack of) explanation 
 
Prediction for quasi-empiricism is based upon induction from past regularities in the flux of 
events. This conflates prediction and explanation. This illicit conflation is commonly referred 
                                                 
8Or conditional expectation, conditional expected value or conditional distribution. The approach is consequently 
often referred to as the ‘average economic regression’ approach (Downward 2015: 2011). 
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to as the ‘symmetry thesis’, whereby the only difference between explanation and prediction 
relates to the direction of time (i.e. if x predicts y, then x is said to `explain´ y). For example, if 
the introduction of teamworking was found to predict an increase in profitability, then the 
former, would be said to `explain´ the latter. This conflation manifests itself in the way 
independent variables are commonly referred to as `explanatory variables´, and/or `predictors´ 
of the magnitude of dependent variables. This is, however, a misconception. Imagine that a 
regression analysis identifies an association between the introduction of teamworking and an 
increase in profitability, or put another way, imagine that the introduction of teamworking 
predicts the increase in profitability. Is anything explained by this? The answer is no. A 
prediction, even a successful one, explains nothing. A regression analysis, even one that 
successfully identifies an association between independent and dependent variables, does not 
reveal why the association comes about and, therefore, lacks explanatory power. 
 
Summary 
 
The lack of explanatory power in individual quantitative empirical studies, rooted as they are 
in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of their commitment to the particular chain of 
meta-theoretical concepts – i.e. an ontology of events or states of affairs; causality as event 
regularity; epistemology based upon identifying event regularities probabilistically specified; 
a method of building theoretically closed systems to engineer the event regularities that 
generate predictions to be tested qua hypotheses; and theory as sets of statements that `set up´ 
the event regularities as predictions, which are then conflated with `explanations´. As these 
studies cannot generate explanations, they cannot generate theoretically informed and 
empirically substantiated explanations either. Unfortunately, this problem is not restricted to 
individual quantitative empirical studies but, as we will see below, carries over into MA more 
generally. 
 
We envisage two potential responses from advocates of MA. First, they might find, demand, 
or carry out individual studies, including quantitative studies, which do have explanatory 
power, or insist on them being used as the appropriate basis for MA. Second, they might 
counter-argue that MA does not lack explanatory power. All MA has sections referred to as 
‘theory’, ‘literature review’, ‘hypothesis building’, or some such, and it is in these sections that 
theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations can be found. Unfortunately, 
these responses will not work. Apropos the first response, whilst qualitative empirical research 
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is essential in the search for theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations 
(Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014; see also Edwards et al., 2014), it is precisely this material that is 
excluded from MA: 
 
'weed out all those papers that do not report data ... as well as those studies that are 
based on the analysis of qualitative data (e.g., ethnographies…and case studies). 
Getting rid of these types of papers is straightforward (Ellis 2005: 98). 
 
Furthermore, in order to find or carry out quantitative studies that do have explanatory power, 
they would have to be rooted in an alternative meta-theory, one not committed to the chain of 
meta-theoretical concepts noted above. Yet, quantitative empirical researchers cannot just 
abandon their commitment to this or that meta-theoretical concept, because these concepts only 
`work´ as a complete package. The alternative, which we propose later, is that we should 
abandon this entire chain of meta-theoretical concepts, and replace it with an alternative. 
 
3.1. Illustrating the meta-theoretical problems with MA 
 
To illustrate our critique, we have selected two recent, highly-cited examples of meta-analyses, 
published in top ranked journals in the authors’ areas of interest. In the first paper, Reichl et al., 
(2014) explore the relation between work-nonwork conflict and burnout by conducting a meta-
analysis of 86 relevant studies, which allows for an analysis of 220 coefficients. In the second, 
Subramony (2009) explores the relationship between bundles of HR practices and specifically 
defined organizational outcomes. This is achieved through a MA of 65 relevant studies, which 
allows for an analysis of 239 separately reported effect sizes. Both are examples of `best 
practice´ MA and the criticisms we raise apply to all the examples of MA we are familiar with. 
 
 
 
Reichl et al. 
 
First, in a (half-page) section entitled `theoretical framework´, Reichl et al. mention `several 
theoretical reasons to expect relations between work–nonwork conflict and burnout´ (p.982-3). 
After a very short theoretical discussion they refer the reader to six sources where, presumably, 
the theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations informing their MA 
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might be found. Further inspection, however, reveals this not to be the case. One study is just 
another MA; two are `standard´ quantitative studies seeking empirical regularities; three offer 
theoretical insight, but are not qualitative empirical studies, and two are extremely dated. Their 
`theoretical framework´ section, then, offers little or nothing in the way of theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanation. 
 
Second, Reichl et al.´s MA tells us that work–nonwork conflict was correlated with emotional 
exhaustion and cynicism, but these relations were moderated by gender, age, family 
characteristics and cultural norms. They are aware of “important gaps in our knowledge about 
underlying processes [i.e. causal mechanisms] and moderating variables” (pg 980), and their 
remedy is to obtain “theoretically derived moderators” - i.e. to theoretically derive the 
moderating causal mechanisms. Whilst this looks like a potential source of theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanation informing their MA, further inspection 
reveals this not to be the case. Apropos the moderator variable gender: one study is a 
theoretically informed quantitative analysis; four are `standard´ quantitative studies, despite 
one having `multi-method´ in the title; and two are dated. Concerning the moderator variable 
family characteristics: two are `standard´ quantitative studies and two are meta-analyses. For 
the ‘age’ variable, there is only a `standard´ quantitative study. Apropos the moderator cultural 
norms: four studies are `standard´ quantitative studies; one is another MA; and two are 
overviews/reviews. None of these references offer the kind of theoretically informed and 
empirically substantiated explanation that would be needed to derive the moderating causal 
mechanisms. This point is developed in more detail later. 
 
Subramony (2009) 
 
Let us turn our attention now to the other example of MA: Subramony´s paper on HRM bundles 
and firm performance. 
 
[HRM] bundles consisting of multiple complementary practices are typically 
considered superior to individual best practices in influencing firm performance. 
This study investigates the relationship between three such bundles (empowerment, 
motivation, and skill-enhancing) and business outcomes…. Although it makes 
conceptual sense to categorize individual HRM practices into these bundles, there 
is insufficient empirical evidence regarding both their proposed synergistic 
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properties and the magnitude of bundle effects on firm performance. I propose to 
bridge this gap in the strategic HRM literature by investigating the relationship 
between empowerment, motivation, and skill bundles and various business 
outcomes; clarifying the synergistic properties of these bundles by comparing their 
effects to those of individual HRM practices; and demonstrating the usefulness of 
these bundles in relation to high-performance work systems (HPWSs) (Subramony 
2009: 745-6, emphasis added) 
 
To say that there is insufficient empirical evidence regarding (π), the proposed synergistic 
properties of bundles of HRM practices, is entirely correct. Subramony´s observation that there 
is insufficient empirical evidence regarding (Ω), the magnitude of bundle effects on firm 
performance has valid and invalid elements. It is invalid in the sense that there are actually 
many quantitative empirical studies seeking to identify the magnitude of bundle effects on firm 
performance. It is, however, valid in the sense that what evidence there is does not support the 
existence of the statistical association he believes exists. Subramony proposes to `bridge this 
gap´ by (a) investigating the relationship between these bundles and business outcomes; (b) 
clarifying the synergistic properties of these bundles by comparing their effects to those of 
individual HRM practices; and (c) demonstrating the usefulness of these bundles in relation to 
HPWS. Notice, however, that there are two `gaps´ - i.e. (π) and (Ω). At best MA can deal with 
(Ω) by engaging in (a) and (c). What MA cannot do, however, is deal with (π) via (b). It cannot 
bridge the gap of insufficient empirical evidence regarding the proposed synergistic properties 
of bundles of HRM because to do this would require theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations of why empowerment, motivation, and skill-enhancing HRM 
practices cause increased performance. MA cannot get anywhere near delivering explanations 
of this kind. 
 
This said, as with Reich et al., Subramony´s MA is not entirely devoid of theoretically informed 
explanations - although few of them are empirically substantiated. He writes: 
 
The combination of multiple empowerment-enhancing practices…is likely to be 
synergistic because of the potential complementarities among these practices. For 
instance, allowing autonomous work teams to manage the production of a 
component or provision of a specific service can enhance employees’ sense of 
responsibility and autonomy within the constraints of their work role. Additionally, 
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the provision of voice and upward feedback mechanisms can help employees view 
themselves as part of a larger organizational system, leading them to engage in 
discretionary behaviors, including suggesting improvements to the products, 
services, or work processes; assuming increased responsibilities; and volunteering 
(e.g., serving on joint management-worker task forces). Also, the presence of 
multiple empowerment-related practices is likely to signal a coherent organization 
wide commitment to employee empowerment, which is likely to result in 
reciprocation in the form of in-role and extra-role behaviors (Subramony 2009: 
748). 
 
Subramony´s brief explanations for the existence of synergies are not unreasonable, but any 
competent researcher in this field could come up with reasonable explanations about dis-
synergies. The fact is, we do not really know which is the case because there are insufficient 
theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the proposed synergies. 
Moreover, MA brings us no closer to obtaining these explanations because it focuses our 
attention on identifying statistical associations, such as that underlying `Hypothesis 1: 
Empowerment-enhancing bundles [of HRM practices] will be positively correlated with 
business outcomes´ (Subramony 2009: 748). 
 
Let us consider an example of how statistical techniques used in MA can often lead us further 
into obscurity. 
 
By calculating the composites of relevant effect sizes within each study, I created 
the empowerment, motivation, and skill bundles. For instance, if a given study 
provided correlations between training and productivity and selection and 
productivity, a single composite score was created to reflect the combined effect of 
both the skill-enhancing practices of training and selection on productivity 
(Subramony 2009: 753). 
 
Subramony takes past research showing correlations between training and productivity, and 
selection and productivity, and combines them into a single composite score reflecting the 
combined effect of training and selection on productivity. Whatever the advantages of doing 
this are, they have to be weighed against the dis-advantages. And the main disadvantage is this; 
to know that there are correlations between training and productivity, and selection and 
16 
 
productivity is not to explain anything – i.e. we remain in the dark as to why these correlations 
come about. But then to combine them into a single score reflecting their combined effect on 
productivity leaves us with an even more complex statistical association about which we 
actually understand even less. We are moving further away from generating theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanations, not getting closer to them. 
 
Note that this has nothing to do with missing moderating or mediating variables. Indeed, if it 
turned out that additional moderating or mediating variables were needed, the problems would 
get even worse: we would end up with yet more variables, and yet more associations between 
them, and be no closer to deriving theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
explanations. 
 
Moreover, what can be done, practically, with Subramony’s argument that:  
 
‘firms can benefit from the adoption of high-performance HRM practices… as long 
as these practices also are complementary. Thus, instead of simply increasing the 
number of HRM practices…firms could derive positive returns by enhancing 
synergy among these practices (Subramony 2006: 759). 
 
The only way this finding could be of substantive, or practical use, would be if it enabled an 
HR manager to successfully predict (solely on the basis of past event regularities) that the 
implementation of a bundle of complementary high-performance HRM practices would be 
followed by increased organisational performance in some future period. Even if an HR 
manager was prepared to implement the bundle, s/he would need to know a great deal more 
about how exactly to `enhance synergy among these practices´ than can be provided in such 
research. For the practitioner, therefore, these exhortations require a peculiar leap of faith that 
diminishes their own insight, experience and expertise. The implication is that the HR manager 
should sacrifice any experienced insight as to why certain HR practices may, or may not, work 
in their own context, and instead follow the numbers. One is left feeling that the HR 
professional might be usefully replaced with an algorithm. 
 
Summary 
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Section 3 established that the lack of explanatory power that characterises individual 
quantitative studies, rooted in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of its commitment to 
a particular chain of meta-theoretical concepts. Unfortunately, this problem carries over into 
MA. Despite MA having dedicated `theoretical´ sections, the latter carry little in the way of 
explanation and, therefore, can offer little prospect of theoretically informed and empirically 
substantiated explanations. The explanations contained in MA are as lacking in explanatory 
power as the individual quantitative studies upon which they are based. Allow us to make the 
point more forcefully: if one individual quantitative study lacks explanatory power, then 
synthesizing scores of them does not increase the explanatory power. 
 
Does this mean that all attempts to synthesise existing research are doomed to failure? We think 
not, but only if we turn to an alternative approach, that we call critical realist synthesis (CRS), 
that is rooted in an entirely different meta-theory. It is to this that we now turn. 
 
4.0 A critical realist alternative9 
 
In order to see exactly where CRS differs from MA, we present CR´s chain of meta-theoretical 
concepts, in the same format as we did for quasi-empiricism in part 3. 
 
Ontology 
 
As well as the actual and the empirical (Table 1) CRs recognise the existence of the ‘deep’ (Table 
2). This stratified ontology is also emergent, meaning that entities existing at one ` level´ are rooted 
in, but irreducible to, entities existing at another `level´. For example, the social is rooted in, but 
irreducible to the biological, which is rooted in, but irreducible to the chemical, which is rooted 
in, but irreducible to the atomic, and so on. (Elder-Vass 2010). Social reality is also 
transformational; Agents reproduce or transform a set of pre-existing mechanisms. Society 
continues to exist only because agents reproduce or transform the mechanisms that causally 
condition their social actions. 
 
 
Domain Entity 
                                                 
9For an introduction of how we might go about gaining these insights, see Dirpal (2015). 
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Empirical Experiences & perceptions 
Actual Events & actions 
‘Deep’ Structures, mechanisms, tendencies, 
powers 
 
Table 2. A stratified or laminated ontology 
 
In a social world, characterised by stratification, emergence, transformation, and, typically, 
configurations of interacting causal mechanisms, it is unsuprising to find partial, approximate, 
rough-and-ready regularities or patterns in the flux of events. Following Lawson (1997, 2003: 
81-83 and 105-7), we refer to these as `demi-regs´, which can be styled as `whenever event x, 
then sometimes, but not always event y´; for example, `women sometimes, but not always, look 
after children more than men´. A system wherein demi-regs predominate, is an open system. 
Thus, whilst any explanations CR generate should `fit´ with the statistical record, the statistical 
record explains nothing in itself (see also Porpora, 2015).  
 
Epistemology 
 
With the recognition that events do not often manifest as regularities and that something must 
govern an irregular flux of events, the emphasis of CR investigation switches from the domains 
of the empirical and actual to the deep: the causal mechanisms that govern the flux of events. For 
example, we noted the claim that the introduction of PRP increases productivity at the firm 
level by 9% (op. cit). CRs might re-focus attention towards the mechanisms by which the 
relationship might occur: the motivation of some, but not all, individuals to increase their effort 
towards those metrics which are being measured, or the impact of labour relations on such 
motivation. In weighing up explanations, CR´s accept the possibility of judging between 
competing claims because they reject the claim that to accept epistemic relativism is to accept 
judgmental relativism. That said, there is no gainsaying the difficulty involved with this, 
especially when such judgement requires far more than simply carrying out statistically-based 
hypothesis testing to see which competing theories have greater explanatory power10.  
 
                                                 
10 That said, it would be remiss of us not to point out that CRs have no single criterion for identifying what 
constitutes explanatory power, and the concept is in need of further elaboration (Lawson 2003: chapter 4; 
Fleetwood & Hesketh 2010: chapter 6).   
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Aetiology 
 
The parts of the social world not characterised by event regularities (i.e. open systems) are still 
governed by something. This something cannot be a law as this would produce constant 
regularities. So instead, CRs use the term tendency to depict the (transfactual) way of acting of a 
thing (or things) with properties (Fleetwood 2009). A tendency is not an empirically observable 
pattern as a tendency can be in play and yet not manifest itself empirically, as it be counteracted 
by other mechanisms (Fleetwood 2012: 13). 
 
To illustrate causation, CRs seek what Hesketh & Fleetwood (2010) refer to as ` thick explanation´- 
i.e. the kind of explanation that requires hermeneutic information - i.e. information relating to a 
range of human cognitive activities such as understanding, intention, purpose, meaning, 
interpretation, reason and so on. We do not, however, know what the cause of the action is, one 
does not understand it, until we know the intention that underlies it, that is, until we know why the 
agent did what s/he did. If, to explain an action is to give a causal account of it, then to explain an 
action is to give an account of why the actor did what s/he did. Whilst exploring motivations is 
always difficult, these can be explored using interviews. Sims-Schouten & Riley (2014) and Smith 
& Elger (2014) show, for instance, how interview-based research facilitates the probing of agent’s 
own understandings of causal relations in organizational contexts. 
 
Methodology 
 
As the social world is an open system, mechanisms cannot be induced or deduced, but must 
instead be retroduced and retrodicted. Retroduction 'consists of a movement [...] from the 
conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of some totality or thing, 
mechanism, structure or condition that is responsible for that given phenomena' (Lawson, 2003: 
145). It usually involves asking a specific kind of question: ‘What thing, if it existed, might 
account for the existence of P’? and might end up identifying Q as the thing in question. 
Retrodiction is used when we are relatively ignorant about the mechanisms in operation that 
are causing the phenomena under investigation. When there is little or no existing theory to act 
as a guide, we must take a voyage of discovery, make hypothetical conjectures, requiring the 
‘scientific imagination’ (See Lewis 1999). We use what we do know to explain what we do not 
know. 
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Open and closed systems 
 
In open systems, theoretically informed claims must be framed in transfactual terms. 
Transfactual claims cannot, however, be empirically substantiated by testing quantitative 
hypotheses. Consider two hypotheses: the first is typical of quasi-empiricism and the second is 
transfactual. 
 
H1 Workers assembled into a team increase profit 
H2 Workers assembled into a team tend to increase profit 
 
The intuition underlying H1 is something like `workers assembled into a team raise the 
probability that profit will increase´. This presumes the existence of a (ontic) stochastic 
regularity, which can be re-conceptualised probabilistically, between assembling workers into 
a team, and the resulting increase in profit. H1 can be tested using `normal´ statistical 
techniques. In complete contrast, the intuition underlying H2 is something like `workers 
assembled into a team have the causal power to raise profit, but sometimes this power is 
actualised and sometimes it is not'. This gives rise to a demi-regularity, rather than a stochastic 
regularity, and thus cannot be re-conceptualised probabilistically. H2 cannot be tested using the 
`normal´ statistical methods rendering quasi-empirical methods such as MA unsuitable for 
open-systems theorising. 
  
Prediction and explanation 
 
CRs hold that, in open systems ‘thick’ explanation is probably our only guide to the future. If, 
for example, one can uncover, and explain, the causal mechanisms (e.g. HR practices) that, 
when drawn upon by workers and managers, increase organisational performance, then one has 
an explanation of the increase in performance. Such an explanation would allow one to 
understand the tendencies generated when workers and managers engage with HR practices. If 
one understands these tendencies one can make tendential predictions. 
 
Importantly, and in contrast to the empiricist tradition, which focuses only on what actually 
happens, powers or tendencies for critical realist are transfactual, and therefore point to the 
potential of entities. Thus, given the appropriate context (i.e. products, production regimes, 
labour relations systems) one mechanism may have more potential to increase performance 
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than another, even if this potential is continually negated by countervailing tendencies. This is 
important because, unlike MA, it points to theorising the possibilities of future social events, 
caused by agentially enacted mechanisms, even if these events have not occurred in the past. 
 
Theory 
 
For CRs, theory consists of statements that deliver causal explanations. We can illustrate this 
by returning to our previous example: if we want to explain the tendency for team-working to 
increase productivity, we might look to existing theory about the relations within teams, 
seeking to develop new insights about (i) exactly how teams (as bundles of causal mechanisms) 
raise productivity; (ii) how agents are engaged with them; and (iii) the complex set of 
interactions between the bundles themselves and between the agents. 
 
Summary 
 
In sum, a CR chain of meta-theoretical concepts can be contrasted to that of quasi-empiricism 
in which MA is rooted (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quasi-empiricism 
 
Critical realism 
Ontology Atomistic, observable, events 
No agency-structure approach, only rational 
agents as individuals. 
Social world is stratified or laminated, emergent, 
transformational, systemically open, complex, 
becoming, processual & relational. 
Agents & structures (i.e. mechanisms) are distinct but 
related. 
Epistemology Knowledge derives from (a) observing (b) 
event regularities. 
 
 
Knowledge derives from uncovering causal 
mechanisms. 
Epistemically but not judgementally relativist. 
 
Aetiology Humean: causality as event regularity. 
Laws, law-like relations & functional 
relations. 
Separates Humean causality from causality as powers 
& tendencies. 
Powers & tendencies replace laws, law-like relations 
& functional relations. 
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Methodology & 
research 
technique 
Some version of the covering law method 
Engineering event regularities via 
theoretically closed systems. 
Exclusively quantitative data & techniques 
such as regression, analysis of variance, factor 
analysis & meta-analysis 
Causal-explanatory. 
Explanation comes via uncovering & understanding 
causal mechanisms. 
Ethnography, participant observation, in-depth 
interviewing critical discourse analysis, action 
research, archaeology, deconstruction & genealogy 
accepted. 
Mainly uses qualitative techniques, but the role of 
(some) quantitative techniques is debated. 
Objective Prediction. 
To construct & test predictions & hypotheses 
to establish whether claims are true or false. 
Explanation. 
Claims must be empirically substantiated, but 
quantitative hypothesis testing is inappropriate. 
  
Explanation Explanation confused with prediction. Explanation is `thick´ - an account of the operation of 
causal mechanisms. 
Explanation is confused with prediction. 
 
Prediction Prediction confused with explanation. 
Prediction based on inductive 
generalisations. 
Spurious precision. 
Tendential prediction based on knowledge of causal 
mechanisms. 
 
Tendential prediction is not precise, but not spurious 
either. 
Theory Vehicle for delivering predictions 
 
Vehicle for delivering causal-explanatory accounts. 
Mode of 
inference 
Deduction & induction Retroduction & retrodiction 
 
Table 3 comparative aspects of Quasi-Empiricism and Critical Realism 
 
With the meta-theoretical framing completed, we can now take the first tentative steps to show 
how the above CR meta-theory might be used to guide CRS. 
 
5.0 Critical realist synthesis (CRS) 
 
In order to help generate theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations, we 
have amended Pawson’s (2004) realist review process, designed for policy interventions, to 
deal with synthesis more generally (Table 4)11. As one’s approach to CRS will vary 
                                                 
11 Pawson (2004) produced an ‘initial sketch’ of how literature might be synthesised to evaluate policy 
interventions. The main structure of the review (define the scope, search for and appraise the evidence, extract 
and synthesise findings) is similar, but the subsequent columns, especially the bullet points, have been created 
23 
 
considerably depending on its purpose, the steps in this table are not meant to be sequential, 
compulsory or exhaustive, but instead provide a broad steer that is intended to guide CRS. 
 
Define the scope of 
the synthesis 
Identify the focus  
 Who are the agents involved? 
 What is the intervention / mechanism being studied? 
 What are the contexts for its use? 
 What are the intentions of those who use it? 
 What is its intended impact? 
What mechanisms 
are assumed? 
 Search for assumed mechanisms / theories in the literature / policies 
 Group, categorise or synthesise theories 
 Design set of theories / mechanisms to be explored / tested 
Search for and 
appraise the 
evidence 
Search for the 
evidence 
 Decide and define review strategy 
 Define search sources, terms and methods to be used 
 Set the thresholds for stopping searching at saturation 
Appraise the 
evidence 
 Does the research address the key mechanisms being studied? 
 Does the research support the conclusions it makes? 
Extract and 
synthesise findings 
Extract the results 
 Identify important mechanisms, contexts, entities, stratification etc. 
 Capture these in tables / templates 
 Undertake retroduction to identify further mechanisms. 
Synthesise 
findings 
 What are the common mechanisms, entities, properties and outcomes? 
 Produce ‘thick’ descriptions of the operation of the mechanism(s) 
 How and why do these vary in different contexts? 
 How do these compare to the ‘assumed’ mechanisms? 
Draw conclusions 
 What are the tendencies of the key mechanisms? 
 What are the key contextual factors which have an impact on the 
operation of the mechanism(s) 
 
Table 4 The process of CRS 
 
We now explore each step in more detail. 
 
Define the scope of the synthesis 
 
                                                 
for the purpose of synthesising literature more generally. We have italicised the areas where we have amended 
Pawson’s original. 
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The scope of CRS will often be in the form of a question like: `how does mechanism M, when 
enacted by agent A, tend to alter outcome O?’. This approach will also work for clarification 
questions, such as ‘what are the properties of mechanism M?’ or ‘why does outcome O often 
occur in context P’. As CRs accept systemic openness, CRS is not only restricted to providing 
a ‘thick’ explanation of the agentially enacted mechanism, but also of the different contexts in 
which the mechanism might generate a tendency to O - or qualitatively different versions of O 
- as well as the unintended consequences of mechanism M´s tendency. This also permits 
consideration of the ways in which the outcome might react back, in a later time period, on 
mechanism M and agent A. 
 
In clarifying the purpose of the review, it is also useful to know the mechanisms which are 
claimed or assumed in the relevant literature or policy. For example, in exploring the question 
do bundles of HRM practices improve performance?, it might be useful to identify the 
assumptions which are made, or theories that are drawn upon, when this is presumed to be the 
case, as these provide a focus for the review which can be explored systematically later. This 
step is not always necessary. 
 
Search for, and appraise the evidence 
 
As CRS focuses on identifying agents and mechanisms, it need not restrict itself to statistical 
studies or indeed studies from any specific discipline, including CR. For example, O’Mahoney 
(2011) reviews the social constructionist identity literature, much of which explicitly rejects 
realism, to retroduce the entities, powers, and mechanisms involved with identity construction. 
Indeed, the ecumenical nature of CR’s review of the literature allows it to use this breadth to 
identify similar causal mechanisms working in a variety of contexts.  Moreover, as Ackroyd 
and Karlsson suggest, the CR researcher is marked by their ‘eclecticism’ when it comes to 
matching innovative methods to collect new data indicative of the existence and character of 
causal mechanisms (2014:22). For example, Pawson (2002) – which is expanded upon below 
- seeks to understand the impact of ‘public disclosure’ on recalcitrant behaviour (i.e. does 
‘naming and shaming’ work?). To investigate this, he drew on a wide range of public disclosure 
policies, from Megan’s Law and school league tables, to hospital star ratings and naming 
prostitute’s clients. This allows exploration of similar mechanisms but in very different 
contexts, permitting the identification of the particular contexts which were more likely to 
generate a tendency for disclosure to affect behaviour. 
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In collecting studies, quantitative work (e.g. those using regression analysis to identify 
statistical associations) should be treated with caution. Instead of dismissing them, however, 
we would check to see if, in addition to the (non-explanatory) statistical data, there is something 
that might help us to create theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations. 
Instead, we are far more favourably disposed to past qualitative empirical research. In both 
cases (and recalling section 3.0) we would be asking ourselves: Does this past research help us 
deepen our understanding of the appropriate agents and mechanisms, how agents and 
mechanisms interact, and the other mechanisms (i.e. `the context´) that dispose this agent to 
interact with one mechanism and not another. 
 
CR accepts that different disciplines may use different terms to describe similar mechanisms – 
though where these terms differ they may be more or less accurate. For example, 
‘enculturation’, ‘socialisation’, ‘institutionalisation’, ‘indoctrination’, ‘learning’, and 
‘disciplining’, might be used in different traditions to describe the ways in which societies 
inform and (re)create the individuals which inhabit them. Such terminological diversity should 
always be critically appraised, as such terms are not apolitical, and for example, can range from 
strong managerialism (‘workers can learn to be more efficient’) to critical (‘workers are 
indoctrinated through induction programmes’). However, such diversity should also be 
embraced as providing potentially useful alternative perspectives on how the agentially enacted 
causal mechanisms operate and relate. More specifically, terms captured in the review may 
operate at different (sometimes emergent) levels - for example, socialisation and learning may 
be different (and related) forms of indoctrination.  
 
In short, then, a CR review of a subject should cast its net wide, searching not only for key 
words (such as HRM, bundles and performance) but also examining historical texts, and 
different disciplines for similar mechanisms that may have operated in different contexts. Thus, 
for the literature review, the search terms and sources would usually be wider than we might 
expect in a standard structured literature review (Tranfield et al. 2003). Once the relevant 
literature has been collected, and this would usually be an ongoing process, it needs to be 
appraised, both in terms of ensuring the research actually addresses the mechanism(s) under 
study, and its internal validity - that the data actually supports the conclusions it makes. 
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Extract and synthesise findings 
 
The purpose of a CRS analysis is to identify the agentially enacted causal mechanisms by 
reviewing extant literature. In CR-oriented studies, these mechanisms will often (though not 
always) be explicit. However, when reviewing non CR-oriented literature the analysis can often 
proceed in two steps. The first is to identify the agentially enacted mechanisms stated within 
the literature, and the second is to retroduce and retrodict further conditions of possibility for 
these. It is important to note that CRS does not require a rejection of any research that is not 
CR in orientation. Let us consider two examples of this latter point. 
 
First, O’Mahoney’s (2011) review, mentioned above, takes the statements of ostensibly anti-
realist authors concerned with identity construction to identify the key agentially enacted 
mechanisms involved. For example, he draws upon an article by Thomas and Davies (2005) 
that details how Kate, a personnel manager in the police service, draws on discourses of 
femininity and parenthood to resist performative employment discourses. O’Mahoney’s first 
step is to identify the context stated explicitly by the authors, including Kate herself, her job, 
the Police, and the various discourses which, for CRs, are causal mechanisms. The second step 
is to retroduce implied mechanisms and powers, such as the power of the Police service to 
employ and discipline workers, and terminate contracts, and the (agential) power of Kate to 
learn skills and reproduce them. We also learn much about discourses – e.g. that they can be 
resisted, that some discourses (such as femininity) exist in tension with others (such as 
masculinity), and that individuals exercise some form of free-will in choosing to engage with 
or resist them. This allows O’Mahoney to argue that, contrary to the anti-realist protestations 
of social constructivists, their research can contribute towards the kind of theoretical informed 
and empirically substantiated explanations sought in CRS. 
 
Second, in seeking to understand the impact of ‘public disclosure’ on recalcitrant behaviour 
Pawson (2002) examines the policy literature to identify the mechanisms at play in the 
literature when culprit behaviour is worsened and policies fail (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Insert figure 1 here. 
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He then reviews the history and operation of the various disclosure policies to identify when 
the mechanisms lead to positive outcomes (Figure 2). For example, he notes that, 
 
‘Megan’s Law swept onto the statutes following the enormous public outcry at the 
brutal death [of a child]. The courts responded to the wave of sentiment that ‘something 
must be done’ and were thus able to brush aside the constitutional challenges forwarded 
by minor lobbies’ (p. 39). 
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
Here, Pawson uses contrastive theory building to identify patterns rather than laws (we would 
say `demi-regs´) about the potential of public disclosure policies to achieve their aims. The 
more tentative and less certain language here is also worth noting, especially in contrast with 
the ‘9%’ of meta-analysis detailed earlier. 
 
‘Although popularly known as ‘naming and shaming’, public disclosure outcomes in 
these cases do not seem to depend, in the long term anyway, on the dishonour of the 
culprits. … Public disclosure is meant to change behaviour – but seems effective only 
in relation to what organises that behaviour in the first place. What is more, in each of 
the [cases], it is the information providers rather than the public who are the key agents 
of change’. (p. 44).  
 
In terms of synthesis, Pawson takes a comparative approach to identifying the mechanisms 
which link X and Y, and provides a ‘thick’ description of how and why these work in different 
circumstances. 
 
Whilst no-one has yet carried out an explicit CRS, some CRs have implicitly started to go down 
this route. Three can be cited as examples. First, Fleetwood´s (2014, 2016) attempt to build a 
CR-oriented alternative model of labour markets draws upon a body of existing theoretical and 
empirical research, that he refers to as `the socio-economics of labour markets´. The key point 
to note is Fleetwood´s rejection of existing quantitative empirical research that is rooted in 
quasi-empiricism because it contributes little or nothing to the generation of theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the way labour markets work. In 
contrast, Fleetwood accepts the `socio-economics of labour markets´ because it consists of 
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existing qualitative empirical research that contributes to the generation of theoretically 
informed and empirically substantiated explanations of the way labour markets work. Whilst 
implicit, Fleetwood´s work on labour markets might be thought of as a rudimentary CRS. 
 
Second, Vincent´s (2011) work, in this journal, focuses attention on emotional experiences at 
work, the organisation control mechanisms which seek to influence these experiences, and how 
different contextual conditions (Mc) affect both organisational control systems and worker 
experiences. Whilst the paper is not explicitly either CR or CRS, it offers a form of analysis 
that is highly consonant with the approach outlined here. The paper maps the structural 
conditions and agential dispositions which affect emotional displays at work, and how these 
combine to explain experiences. It highlights, in in particular, how employers' regulation and 
rewarding of workers' emotional displays interacted with workers conformity (or not) with 
organisational interests and rule systems. The paper then considers the contextual conditions 
that impel different types of control system and experience, for example, by highlighting the 
circumstances in which workers are rewarded for specific emotional displays at work. Overall, 
this paper contributes by developing theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
insights about the way emotions are managed, experienced and enacted at work, offering 
another rudimentary CRS. 
 
Third, Dirpal (2015) starts from the position that past quantitative empirical research on the 
HRM-Performance cannot explain why HRM practices are linked to performance. He re-
theorises HRM practices to develop the concept of an `HRMechanism´ (i.e. HRM practice + 
causal mechanism) before applying qualitative research techniques to investigate what would 
normally be considered a quantitative research programme. Thus he offers a (meta) 
theoretically informed piece of qualitative research into six HRMechanisms: team working, 
corporate culture, empowerment, work-life balance, performance appraisal and reward. What 
makes Dirpal´s research interesting for our purposes is how he uses past qualitative empirical 
research as a quasi-CRS.  What he lacks, initially, is a sophisticated understanding of exactly 
how HRM practices may or may not work to influence organisational performance. He turns 
to the existing literature to glean any theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
insights, uses them to frame his interviews. He finds that team working, performance appraisal 
and work-life balance, generate powers/tendencies to increase organizational performance, 
whereas corporate culture, empowerment and rewards generate neutral powers/tendencies vis-
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á-vis organizational performance. Moreover, he generates causal-explanations of exactly what 
these HRMechanisms do to generate these powers/tendencies. 
 
 
Aligning CRS and CR 
 
CRS is built upon the meta-physical claims of CR detailed in Section 4. In this section, we 
provide more detail about the alignment of our approach with specific methodological and 
theoretical applications of CR, namely Bhaskar’s RRRE approach, and Lawson’s contrastive 
explanation approach. 
 
The aims of CRS are of course compatible with CR empirical or applied research. Bhaskar´s 
(1998: 129) RRRE model, for example, suggests the following four steps for undertaking such 
work: 
 
1. Resolution of a complex event into its components (causal analysis). 
2. Redescription of component causes. 
3. Retroduction to possible (antecedent) causes of components via independently 
validated normic statements. 
4. Elimination of alternative possible causes of components 
 
According to Collier, (1994: 163) `RRRE has redescription as its second stage, indicating the 
presence of an already established stock of concepts, well enough defined....to justify using 
them for revisionary description´. We would add that the second and third step definitely, and 
perhaps the first and fourth also, would be impossible to take without existing knowledge and, 
therefore, without drawing upon existing research.   
 
There are, however, two potential problems that we want to eliminate before proceeding. First, 
are we not simply `making a virtue out of a necessity´? After all, RRRE or otherwise, almost 
all empirical researchers start with existing research. What sets CRS apart, however, is that a 
great deal of meta-theoretical thought goes into identifying precisely the kinds of existing 
research that will be accepted and rejected; not anything `goes´. Second, the same could be said 
of MA: not anything `goes´ for MA´s either. Indeed, they accept existing quantitative research, 
and reject existing qualitative research. This is not, however, because MA´s hold that 
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quantitative research delivers theoretically informed and empirically substantiated 
explanations, but simply because only quantitative research can be analysed with MA´s 
statistical toolkit. Thus, CR eliminates research that it holds to be theoretically flawed (and for 
other reasons) whereas MA is driven by a desire to employ specific set of statistical techniques. 
With these potential problems dealt with, we can turn to the issue of illustrating how CRs might 
use CR methods to guide CRS. 
 
Those new to CR often complain about the abstractness of retroduction and retrodiction, and 
so it is important to consider how we can more easily deploy these approaches to extract new 
understanding in the context of CRS. In our view, and whilst far from being a point of departure, 
those wishing to employ CRS can aim towards Lawson’s (1997, 2003, 2009) contrastive 
method. This approach compares ostensibly similar cases (e.g. specific countries, such as the 
UK or China; old or young workers; corporations or charities) to identify different or surprising 
demi-regs, generated by similar causal mechanisms, but calling attention to specific contextual 
features (Mc) that interact to affect outcomes differently in otherwise similar circumstances. 
Thus, rather than explaining a single outcome (set of events En), the objective is to account for 
some contrast "Pn rather than Qn" and to use retroduction and retrodiction to identify the 
particular conditions which drove the outcome in particular direction. Arguably, by identifying 
our analytical target in terms of particular forms of difference, in worlds that are otherwise 
similar, the process of working out the particular mechanism that is causal, in one instance or 
another, becomes much simplified. This way, knowledge of causal mechanisms can develop 
incrementally by reflecting on unexpected contrasts in the existing stock of research.  
 
Whilst contrastive explanation offers a viable strategy for knowledge development, as it 
focuses attention on the particular, getting any CRS inspired project to the point at which a 
contrastive strategy is possible typically involves a lot of ground-work (as illustrated in Table 
4). However, as any CRS project assimilates the existing body of knowledge, in CR compatible 
terms, and approaches the point of analytical saturation (when it the review exhausts what we 
know), it becomes increasingly possible to deploy a contrastive explanatory method. At this 
point, the project will understand the stock of related qualitative described cases and examples 
and the different conditions that explain demi-regs within these. As a consequence, CRS 
scholars will find themselves in a position to explain novel causal mechanisms that give rise to 
unexplained and unexpected events.  
 
31 
 
Conclusions 
 
The appeal of methods that allow for an integration and synthesis of existing research to 
produce more robust and, even, novel findings is obvious. It is in this context that MA has 
grown in popularity. Yet, even on its own terms, MA has a number of technical, procedural and 
practical problems that can limit its usefulness. More significantly for our argument, the meta-
theoretical foundations of MA, which have attracted little, if any, critical comment, are flawed. 
We have argued that the lack of explanatory power that characterises individual quantitative 
studies, rooted in quasi-empiricist meta-theory, is the result of their commitment to a particular 
chain of meta-theoretical concepts. Unfortunately, this problem carries over into MA, meaning 
the explanations contained in MA are as lacking in explanatory power as the individual 
quantitative studies upon which they are based.  
 
What then is left for MA? We have argued that regression analyses, and thus MAs, are not 
suitable for the open, emergent systems that typify organisational studies, or indeed, the social 
world generally. This is because the interaction of complex, emergent mechanisms in different 
contexts does not give rise to regularities in relations between events. Yet, for critical realists 
this does not mean jettisoning MA altogether. Two alternatives are proposed here. The first is 
that if MAs are not suited to open systems, then they are suited to closed systems, such as IT 
or the physical sciences, where empirical regularities between events exist. This raises an 
interesting question as to ‘whether some disciplines can be classified as ‘less open’ / ‘more 
closed’ on the basis that they concern themselves with simpler or less emergent systems. The 
answer to this question is contested and cannot be explored in detail here, but Fleetwood (2016) 
provides an overview of the key issues, arguing that systems are either open or closed. 
 
The second approach is implied by Porpora (2015: 62): 
 
Demoting regression analysis and other statistical techniques from explanation to 
evidence, critical realism has no reason to reject them as such....Statistics are employed 
to indicate the contingent operation of a mechanism in a particular context. 
 
This shift in this framing of MAs implies that well-designed regression analyses (and therefore 
MAs) can provide indications that causality may be at work, or at least that phenomena require 
investigation. For example, research claiming to identify a statistical association between 
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bundles of HRM practices and improved organisational performance, have prompted authors 
to carefully investigate the mechanisms and contexts that might sustain such an association 
(Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2006). Importantly, subsequent investigation can, and sometimes 
does, undermine claims deriving from these statistical associations. In the MOS literature, for 
example, quantitative research claiming to have identified an association between HRM 
practices (e.g. TQM, BPR or Lean) in high performing organisations, have been exposed by 
qualitative studies revealing flawed assumptions. Some qualitative research, for example, has 
suggested that reporting of these practices has been exaggerated by respondents (e.g. Collinson 
et al., 1998).  
 
Our critique of MA led us to develop an alternative, CRS, which is driven by the objective of 
creating theoretically informed and empirically substantiated explanations. CRS, rooted in CR 
meta-theory and predicated upon the claim that the social world is characterised by demi-regs, 
requires a conception of causality that is not exhausted by regularities in the flux of events, but 
is understood at the relative push and pull of powers or tendencies. As we demonstrate in part 
four, this allows CRs to make tendential predictions and, thereby, generate substantive 
implications. We explained how CRS allows for insights to be incorporated from the widest 
possible source material, including qualitative research, social constructionist-oriented 
research and, with caution, some quantitative, empirical research. CRS resonates with work on 
systematic reviews by other realist scholars, such as Pawson, and thus contributes to debates 
already existing in social science, more generally, about how realist philosophical 
commitments might shape analyses. 
 
Although we hold that CRS is a superior approach to that of MA, we note here that CRS does 
have a number of problematic features. First, the method of CRS is less formulaic than that of 
MA, putting more emphasis on the intuition (via retroduction and retrodiction) of the 
researcher. Moreover, the outcome of CRS is more complex than the single number generated 
by MA, and perhaps therefore less attractive to some managers or policy makers. We would 
hope, however, that our proposal places an emphasis on the expertise and experience of these 
people in helping understand the complexities of the world in which they are embedded. 
Secondly, tendential predictions are only that. As Pawson et al. note: social interventions are 
so complex that there is little hope of reproducing them, and even if one could, they are so 
context specific that the same ‘assemblage’ may go onto misfire’ (2005:21). Thirdly, although 
we have pointed to examples of good practice in parts of a CRS (e.g. O’Mahoney 2011; Pawson 
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2005; Fleetwood 2014; Vincent, 2011), and explained how we would approach a CRS, we have 
not found an examples of a complete CRS. This is a gap that we would urge researchers to 
explore.   
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Figure 1 Mechanisms of public disclosure on culprit resistance (simplified from Pawson 
  2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 When disclosure policies lead to successful outcomes (simplified from Pawson 
  2002) 
 
 
 
